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COMMENT
THE EXERCISE OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES: A CLARIFICATION
INTRODUCTION
Historically there had been a notion that once a case came properly
within the jurisdiction of a federal court, that court was compelled to exer-
cise its jurisdiction and decide the case. This notion is evidenced in dicta
of an early case, where it was said:
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid
a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitu-
tion.... With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case
may be attended, we must decline it, if it be brought before us.
We have no more right to decide the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the Constitution.'
Although historically this may have been the attitude of the federal
courts, it is not their attitude today. Rather, there has developed a doc-
trine of abstention exercised by the federal courts in certain types of
cases, whereby the federal court, although having a case properly before
it, will abstain from deciding the case, either completely or until the
state court has had an opportunity to make a determination on the
questions involved.'
The doctrine has been judicially constructed to avoid premature de-
terminations of federal constitutional issues' and to minimize federal
interference with state domestic policy and state action.4 When these
"exceptional circumstances" are present in a given case, the federal
court will abstain from deciding the questions involved.5
1. Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
2. Those sources which pertain to the abstention doctrine in the federal courts are:
Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered 37 Tx. L. REV. 815 (1959); Note, Stays
of Federal Proceedings In Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60 CoLUM.
L. REV. 684 (1960); Note, Abstention: An Exercise In Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226
(1959); Note, Louisiana Power and Light v. Thibodaux: The Abstention Doctrine Expanded,
69 YALE L.J. 643 (1960).
3. The leading case in this area is Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941).
4. One of the leading cases in this area is Alabama Public Service Commission v. South-
ern Railroad Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
5. Note, Abstention: An Exercise In Federalism, supra, note 2 at 227.
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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the exercise of the abstention
doctrine by the federal courts and to examine the consequences of its
exercise on the particular litigants involved.0
AREAS OF APPLICATION
A. "Pullman Type" Abstention
The most clearly established area where the abstention doctrine is
exercised is where state action is being challenged in a federal court as
being repugnant to the federal constitution and there are state law ques-
tions involved which may be dispositive of the case. The classic case in
which this type of abstention is exemplified is Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Co.7 In this case the company was seeking to enjoin
enforcement of an order of the Texas Commission.8 In addition to the
federal constitutional question presented, 9 there was a substantial ques-
tion of state law as to whether the Texas statute gave the commission
power to make the order in question. The federal court, which had
jurisdiction because of the federal question raised, had ancillary jurisdic-
tion to decide the state issues as well.' 0 However, the Supreme Court
ordered the trial court to abstain from deciding the case but to retain
jurisdiction until the parties had an opportunity to obtain from the state
court a decision on the state issues involved. A unanimous Court said:
In this situation of federal court of equity is asked to decide an
issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced to-
morrow by a state adjudication .... The resources of equity are
equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative
decision adjudication."
The effect of this decision and the primary purpose for the doctrine's
exercise in this type of case is to let the state courts decide the state
questions raised and to provide a way for the federal courts to avoid
deciding a federal constitutional question prematurely or unnecessarily,
for if the state court should hold the commission's order bad as a matter
of state law, there will be no need for the federal court to pass on the
6. See generally Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HAnv. L.
REV. 1358 (1960).
7. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
8. The order of the Commission was that "'no sleeping car shall be operated on any
line of railroad in the state of Texas .. . [in original] unless such cars are continuously
in the charge of an employee ... [in original] having the rank and position of Pullman
conductor.'" 312 U.S. at 497.
9. Since all porters working on such railways were generally negroes and all con-
ductors were generally white, the portErs, intervening as party plaintiffs, assailed the order
as a denial of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment of the federal constitution.
10. Siler v. Louisville and N.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
11. 312 US. 496, 500 (1941).
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federal question. Federal court abstention in this type of case has com-
monly become known as the "Pullman Type" abstention.1 2
It is important to note at this point that this particular exercise of
the abstention doctrine is inapplicable where the state law is settled.'1
In that event the federal court must decide the federal constitutional
questions in the case, regardless of the severity, providing, of course,
that the case is properly before the federal court. There would be no
purpose for the federal court to remand the case to the state court be-
cause the state questions involved are finally settled. This same result
must be reached where it is clear that the case involved a state statute
which is unconstitutional no matter how it may be construed by the state
courts.' 4
B. State Administration of State Affairs
A second established area in which the abstention doctrine is exercised
by the federal court is where the court refrains from exercising its juris-
diction in order to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a
state of its own affairs. One of the leading cases in this area is Alabama
Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co.15 In this case the
railroad company was challenging an order given by the Public Service
Commission refusing to allow discontinuance of the operations of certain
trains in the state. The railroad could have appealed the commission's
order to a state court but had come instead to the federal court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship and federal question jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court said: "As adequate state court review of an administra-
tive order based upon predominantly local factors is available to appellee,
intervention of a federal court is not necessary for the protection of
federal rights."' 6
12. Other cases in which the "Pullman Type" abstention has been applied are: Harrison
v. N.AA.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (the state court had not yet construed a state statute
affecting plaintiff association, enforcement of which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin. The Court
added: "all we hold is that these enactments should be exposed to state construction or
limiting interpretation before the federal courts are asked to decide upon their constitution-
ality, so that federal judgment will be based on something that is a complete product of the
state, the enactment as phrased by its legislature and as construed by its highest court." at
178) ; City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959)
(action for a declaratory judgment in the federal court in reference to a Mississippi statute,
assailed as violative of the federal and state constitutions. The Court said: "Proper exercise
of federal jurisdiction requires that controversies involving unsettled questions of state law
be decided in the state tribunals preliminary to a federal court's consideration of the under-
lying federal constitutional questions." at 640).
13. Wright, supra note 2, at 818.
14. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
15. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
16. Id. at 349.
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The primary purpose for the exercise of the abstention doctrine in this
area is to preserve the smooth operation of the state and federal govern-
mental systems. Hence, in these circumstances, under the usual rule of
comity governing the exercise of equitable discretion, jurisdiction by
federal courts in matters affecting domestic policies of the states [the
parties] should be left to pursue through the state courts whatever rights
[they] may have." This attitude of the federal courts is consistent with
the theory that the federal and state governmental systems are separate
and distinct sovereigns.
Although it is well established that the doctrine is applied in the afore-
mentioned types of case, nevertheless, there remains some confusion as
to precisely when the doctrine will be applied. For example, in two cases
involving facts arising out of eminent domain proceedings, the Supreme
Court reached completely different conclusions in regard to the federal
court's use of the abstention doctrine. In County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda's a landowner brought an independent action of ouster pur-
suant to a state statute to challenge the validity of the taking of his
property. The action was in the federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. 9 The state law involved was clear and well established and
the federal court dismissed the action believing that it should not inter-
fere with the state's administration of its own affairs. The Supreme Court
by a 5-4 decision held that it was error to do so and the district court was
directed to hear the case. The Court stated: "adjudication of the issues
in this case by the District Court would present no hazard of disrupting
federal-state relations."2 ° In addition the Court stated: "the fact that a
case concerns a State's power of eminent domain no more justifies ab-
stention than the fact that it involves any other issue related to sov-
ereignty."2 1 According to these statements made by the Court, one must
conclude that abstention is not practiced by the federal courts in a case
involving an eminent domain proceeding; a proceeding which intimately
involves state action in its administration.
17. Id. at 350. Other cases in which this second type of abstention has been applied
are: Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959) (action to enjoin the enforcement of a state
statute not allowing recovery for consequential damages where no property is actually taken.
The Court said: "Reflected among the concerns which have traditionally counseled a federal
court to stay its hand are the desirability of avoiding unseemly conflict between two sov-
ereignties, the unnecessary impairment of state functions, and the premature determination
of constitutional questions. All those factors are present here." at 224) ; Great Lakes Dredge
and Docks Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943) (an action involving declaratory judgments
in reference to state taxes).
18. 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1966).
20. 360 U.S. at 189.
21. Id. at 191.
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However, the same Court that decided Mashuda decided Louisiana
Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux22 on the same day and reached
a completely contrary result in regard to the applicability of the absten-
tion doctrine in an eminent domain case. In Thibodaux the condemnee
removed the action to a federal court on the basis of diversity and chal-
lenged the taking of his property. The state law in this case was unclear.
On his own motion the trial judge ordered the action stayed until the
state court had had an opportunity to construe the statute. The Supreme
Court by a 6-3 margin upheld the stay. In upholding the exercise of the
abstention doctrine the Court noted: "The justification for this power,
to be exercised within the indicated limits, lies in regard for the respective
competence of the state and federal court systems and for the mainte-
nance of harmonious federal-state relations in a matter close to the polit-
ical interests of a State.
23
The two cases differ in that the state law in the Mashuda case was clear
and definite, whereas the state law in Thibodaux was unclear. 4 Because
the law was unclear in Thibodaux, the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's order to stay the proceedings until the state court had an oppor-
tunity to clarify the law involved. The Court said:
The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district
judge, when his familiarity with the problems of local law so
counsels him, to ascertain the meaning of a disputed state stat-
ute from the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively-the
courts of the State under whose statute eminent domain is
sought to be exercised-rather than himself make a dubious
and tentative forecast.25
Taken together the cases establish that abstention can apply in emi-
nent domain cases where the law is unsettled. However, the cases are
also illustrative of the unsettled application of the abstention doctrine
in those cases involving the administration by a state of its own affairs.
C. Civil Rights: Narrow and Broad Areas
Another area in which the abstention doctrine has been applied is that
of Civil Rights, a highly sensitive area involving a great deal of national
concern. In particular, the doctrine has been applied in certain cases
instituted at the state level with subsequent pre-trial removal sought to
the federal level pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).26 The federal court
22. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
23. Id. at 29.
24. An old and unconstrued statute seemed to permit the taking, but an opinion of
the state attorney general appeared to deny such a power. 360 U.S. at 26.
25. 360 U.S. at 29.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1966). The text of the specific provision involved is:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a
1967-19681
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has established a narrow, well-defined area in which pre-trial removal
pursuant to § 1443(1) can be successfully maintained. 7 Two cases in
particular, Georgia v. Rachel28 and City of Greenwood v. Peacock29 are
illustrative of the requirements needed in order to successfully remove
an action pursuant to § 1443 (1).
The requirement established by the federal courts is that it must be
shown before trial that petitioners seeking removal are denied or cannot
enforce in the courts of the state their civil rights. In effect, there must
be a state law predicting a denial of equal civil rights. ° In addition to
this requirement the Court in Gibson v. Mississippi3 gave some indica-
tion that removal might be justified even in the absence of a discrimina-
tory state enactment if an equivalent basis could be shown for an equally
firm prediction that the defendant would be denied or could not enforce
his equal civil rights in the state court.
In the Rachel case, the respondents sought removal pursuant to § 1443
(1) relying on specific provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 The
respondents were being prosecuted under a Georgia trespass statute
making it a misdemeanor to refuse to leave the premises of another when
requested to do so by the owner of the property or a party in charge.3"
In the course of its opinion the Court stated, in reference to § 1443 (1),
that "'any law providing for . ..equal civil rights' must be construed
to mean any law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial
equality.) 34
state court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof; ....
27. The two cases in which this well defined area was established by the federal courts
are Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1906) and Strauder v. West Virginia 100 U.S. 303 (1906).
28. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
29. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
30. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800 (1966).
31. 162 U.S. 565, 581 (1895).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 a(a) and 2000 a-2(c) (1964). Specifically, sections 201(a) and
203(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were relied upon by petitioners. Section 201(a) guar-
antees equal enjoyment of places of public accommodation without discrimination on the
grounds of race. The language of 203 bars any attempt to punish any person for peaceably
seeking services in a place of public accommodation as construed in Hamm v. City of Rock
Hill, 374 U.S. 306, 310 (1964). That language prohibits even a prosecution based upon a
refusal to leave such premises when the request to leave was made for racial reasons.
33. Georgia v. Rachel 384 U.S. 780, 783 (1966).
34. Id. at 792. The Court continued ". . . . and defendants' broad claims under the
First and Fourteenth amendment due process clause could not sustain removal under
§ 1443(1). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a law providing for equal civil rights in that it
confers specific rights of racial equality."
[Vol. 6:269
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The Court allowed the removal of this action under § 1443(1) upon a
petition alleging that the prosecution stemmed exclusively from the peti-
tioners' peaceful exercise of their right to equal accommodation in estab-
lishments covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964."5 The Court added
that the Civil Rights Act specifically guaranteed, as construed in Hamm
v. City of Rock Hill, 6 that the conduct alleged by respondents in their
petition for removal may not be the subject of state trespass prosecutions.
Thus, the respondents, as required by § 1443 (1), had established that
they were denied or could not enforce in the state court a right under the
Civil Rights Act providing for equal civil rights, since the mere act of
being brought before a state court to defend such a prosecution amounted
to a denial of their equal civil rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964."'
In contrast to the respondents in Rachel, the petitioners in the Peacock
case sought removal pursuant to § 1443 (1) basing their claim particularly
on the first amendment right of free speech." Removal was denied by
the Supreme Court on the ground that those rights alleged to have been
denied petitioners are not part of the equal civil rights as referred to by
§ 1443 (1). The Court added that these are broad civil rights which are
not couched in terms of racial equality, which is required of those civil
rights referred to in § 1443(1) ." In denying removal the Court added:
It is not enough to support removal under § 1443 (1) to allege
or show that the defendant's federal equal civil rights have been
illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials
in advance of trial, that the charges against defendant are false,
or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a par-
ticular state court .... Under § 1443 (1), the vindication of the
defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the
rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of
the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law
that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of
bringing the defendant to trial in the state court."
35. In this particular case the petitioners sought service in a privately owned restaurant
open to the public in Atlanta, Georgia.
36. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
37. Georgia v. Rachel 384 U.S. 780, 804 (1966).
38. 384 U.S. 808 (1966). The removal claims were fundamentally based on allegations
that the individual petitioners were arrested because they were Negroes or were helping
Negroes to assert their rights and that they were innocent of the charges against them or
that they would be unable to obtain fair state trials.
39. 384 U.S. at 825.
40. Id. at 827-28. This principle has been applied consistently in various other cases,
some of which are: Chestnut v. People of the State of New York, 370 F.2d 5 (1966) ; State
of Arkansas v. Shaddox, 261 F. Supp. 566 (1966) ; Richburg v. State of South Carolina, 257
F. Supp. 470 (1966).
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Thus, according to the narrowly defined area in which removal under
§ 1443 (1) can be successfully made, as established by the Supreme Court
and illustrated in the Rachel and Peacock decisions, the federal courts
will abstain from hearing the case on removal and the parties will be
relegated to the state courts for a determination of the questions raised.
Abstention has also been applied by the federal courts where the more
broad civil rights are alleged to have been infringed. One of the leading
cases in this area of abstention is Dombrowski v. Pfister.41 In this case,
appellants were seeking to enjoin prosecutions or threatened prosecutions
for alleged violations of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Com-
munist Control Law and Communist Propaganda Law. Appellants con-
tended that the statutes violated the first and fourteenth amendment
guarantees securing freedom of expression because of the statute's over-
bredth, which made them susceptible to sweeping and improper appli-
cation. The three judge district court abstained from deciding the case
because they felt that a possible narrowing construction by the state
court would avoid unnecessary decisions of stated constitutional ques-
tions. The Supreme Court reversed holding that the "doctrine is inap-
propriate [in a case where] statutes are justifiably attacked on their face
as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging
protected activities. '4 2 In the course of its opinion the Court stated that
it is generally assumed that constitutional limitations imposed by the Su-
preme Court will be followed by state courts and prosecutors. The mere
possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional standards
won't usually amount to that irreparable injury necessary to justify a
disruption of orderly state proceedings.
However, allegations in the complaint raise a case where defense of
the state's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindications of
constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss or impairment
of freedom of expression will occur if appellants must await the state
court's disposition and ultimate review by Supreme Court of any adverse
determinations. If true, these allegations clearly show irreparable injury.43
According to Dombrowski, unless there is a showing of irreparable harm
by reason of a denial of federal constitutional rights, the federal courts
41. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Id. at 489-90.
43. Id. at 484-6. The essential contentions made in appellants' complaint were that the
statutes on their face were violative of the first and fourteenth amendments securing free-
dom of expression, and that due to their overbreadth, they are made susceptible to sweeping
and improper application abridging those rights. In addition, threats to enforce the statutes
against the appellants are not made with any intentions of securing valid convictions, but
rather are part of a plan to employ arrest, seizures, and threats of prosecution under state
law to harass appellants and discourage their activities in Louisiana.
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will abstain from hearing the case and defer to the state courts for a
determination of the questions presented.4
D. Difficult State Law Questions
It is generally accepted today that the federal courts will not apply
the abstention doctririe in private litigation merely to avoid deciding
difficult questions of state law. A leading authority in this area is Mere-
dith v. Winter Haven.45 In this case certain municipal bondholders were
seeking to enjoin the retirement of bonds on alleged unlawful terms. The
issue was whether the city was authorized under a state statute and the
state constitution to issue the bonds without a referendum, and if the
bonds were not validly issued, what recovery were the bondholders en-
titled to receive.4 ' The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals order
that the case be dismissed on abstention grounds. The Court, by Chief
Justice Stone, announced broadly that "... . the difficulties of ascertain-
ing what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be
do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to
decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly
brought to it for decision."47 The Court added that the abstention doc-
trine is only to be applied in those cases involving exceptional circum-
stances48 and that the decision in this case is only concerned with the
extent of the city's liability on its refunding bonds. Specifically, the Court
noted:
Decision here does not require the federal court to determine
or shape state policy governing administrative agencies. It en-
tails no interference with such agencies or with the state courts.
No litigation is pending in the state courts in which the ques-
tions here presented could be decided. We are pointed to no
public policy or interest which would be served by withholding
44. Other areas of broad civil rights where the abstention doctrine has been applied
are: A.M. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (state statute imposing conditions
upon the right to vote in federal elections was assailed as being violative of the twenty-
fourth amendment, prohibiting the imposition of a poll or any other tax on the right to
vote in those type of elections) ; Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218 (1964) (suit by Negro school children to enjoin the County School Board
from refusing to operate an efficient system of public free schools in the County and to
enjoin payment of public funds to help support private schools which excluded students
on account of race) ; Baggett v. Bullett, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (class action by the staff of
the University of Washington seeking to have two Washington statutes requiring the exe-
cution of two different oaths by state employees and for an injunction against the enforce-
ment of these statutes by appellees).
45. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 234.
48. Id.
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from petitioners the benefit of the jurisdiction which Congress
has created with the purpose that it should be availed of and
exercised subject only to such limitations as traditionally justify
courts in declining to exercise the jurisdiction which they pos-
sess.
4 9
Although Meredith is generally considered to be a statement of the
federal courts' position in regard to the exercise of the abstention doc-
trine in the area of unsettled state law, its influence is difficult to assay.
In Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. Thibodaux" the district court judge,
on his own motion, ordered that further proceedings in the eminent
domain case would be stayed until the Supreme Court of Louisiana had
been given an opportunity to interpret the unclear state law involved in
that particular case. The United States Supreme Court upheld the lower
court's order stating:
The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district judge,
when his familiarity with the problems of local law so counsels
him, to ascertain the meaning of a disputed state statute from
the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively-the courts
of the State under whose statute eminent domain is sought to
be exercised-rather than himself make a dubious and tentative
forecast.5
1
As a result of Thibodaux certain authorities believe that the case is
an extension of the exercise of abstention by the federal courts in the
area of cases involving questions of unsettled state law. 2
E. As a Matter of Convenience
Although not having Supreme Court sanction, the abstention doctrine
has been applied in two second circuit decisions 53 merely for the con-
venience of the federal courts. The federal court abstained from hearing
the Mottolese case holding that "the court of appeals may judicially
notice that the non jury docket in the Southern District of New York is
approximately eleven months in arrears. 54
49. Id. at 237.
50. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
51. Id. at 29.
52. See generally Note, Louisiana Power and Light v. Thibodaux: The Abstention
Doctrine Expanded, supra note 2. A possible solution to this problem is suggested in Clay
v. Sun Insurance Office Limited, 363 U.S. 207 (1960) wherein the Court discusses a certi-
fication device, by which the Florida legislature allows the Supreme Court of Florida to
adopt rules answering questions of state law certified to it by federal appellate courts. The
specific statute is: FLA. STAT. § 25,031 (1959).
53. P. Beiersdorf and Co., Inc. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (1957) (action for trademark
infringements, contract breach, and for an accounting); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d
301 (1949) (a shareholders derivative suit against corporation directors, past and present,
and a number of other corporations).
54. 176 F.2d at 303.
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At this point it is important to note that the abstention doctrine is
applied in both equitable55 and legal actions. Until now practically every
case discussed involved some sort of equitable relief. However, in Clay
v. Sun Insurance Office Limited56 the Supreme Court ordered the court
of appeals to abstain from deciding the case in a common law action to
recover money under an insurance contract. The Court stated: "Even
without such a facilitating statute we have frequently deemed it appro-
priate, where a federal constitutional question might be mooted thereby,
to secure an authoritative state court's determination of an unresolved
question of its local law."'57
Accordingly, the abstention doctrine is applied by the federal courts
uniformly, disregarding equitable and legal distinctions completely.
ONCE ABSTENTION HAS BEEN EXERCISED
Assuming the abstention doctrine has been exercised by the federal
court and the case is dismissed without the federal court retaining juris-
diction5" pending a state determination of the questions raised, the entire
litigation is shifted to the state court. The state court then decides the
questions raised and if any substantial federal questions remain after
complete state adjudication, the litigants have recourse to the United
States Supreme Court by appeal or certiorari. 9 The effect of such action
by the federal court is two-fold. Federal jurisdiction granted by statute
to protect citizens from unconstitutional state action is completely
negated. In addition, the litigants are left with no federal protection
against state court delay. °
Assume, however, that the federal court, upon the exercise of the
abstention doctrine, retains jurisdiction of the case pending a state court
determination of the issues raised.6 By reason of its action the federal
court creates somewhat of a dilemma for the litigants concerned.
55. See Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) and Alabama Public
Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
56. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
57. Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Lt'd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960). The statute referred
to was FLA. STAT. § 25,031 (1959) which allowed the Supreme Court of Florida to answer
questions certified to it by federal appellate courts.
58. Dismissal of the case without retaining jurisdiction is generally practiced in those
cases in which the federal court abstains in order to avoid interfering with the state's
administration of state affairs. See Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959) and Alabama
Public Service Commission v. Southern Railroad Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1), (2) & (3) (1966).
60. Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HAsv. L. Rav. 1358, 1359
(1960).
61. Retention of jurisdiction pending a state court determination is generally applied
in the "Pullman Type" cases. See Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (In. the
course of it's opinion the Court stated that by the exercise of this principle federal jurisdiction
is not abdicated, rather there is merely a postponement of its exercise; it serves the policy
1967-19681
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Must the litigant raise both the state law and federal law questions in
the state court proceedings or may he merely raise the former, reserving
the latter for an initial determination by the federal court? According to
Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee, C.I.O. v.
Windsor62 both the state and federal questions must be urged in the
state courts so that the state questions can be decided in context with
the federal constitutional questions involved. This case involved an action
in the federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of an Alabama
statute.63 The statute was assailed as abridging the freedoms of expres-
sion and association of the public employees of Alabama, and violating
the due process, equal protection and privileges and immunities provisions
of the fourteenth amendment. The district court abstained from exer-
cising its jurisdiction pending a state court determination of the questions
involved. Throughout the state proceedings, appellants raised only the
state law questions involved without presenting any of the federal con-
stitutional issues. Subsequent to the state proceedings, which were decided
adversely to appellants' contentions, the cause was resubmitted to the
district court for an initial determination of the federal questions in-
volved. The action was dismissed. The Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment of the lower federal court and remanded the case to it with direc-
tions to retain jurisdiction pending appropriate state court adjudication.
The Court stated:
In an action brought to restrain the enforcement of a state
statute on constitutional grounds, the federal court should retain
jurisdiction until a definitive determination of local law ques-
tions is obtained from the local courts.
The bare adjudication of the Alabama Supreme Court that
the union is subject to this act does not suffice since that court
was not asked to interpret the statute in light of the constitu-
tional objections presented to the District Court.64
By reason of Windsor requiring that both the state and federal ques-
tions be urged in the state court proceedings, is the federal court, which
had proper jurisdiction to decide the case in the first instance, ousted of
its original jurisdiction in respect to the federal questions involved after
of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention; and it spares the federal courts of un-
necessary constitutional adjudication.) and Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941).
62. 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
63. In 1953 the Alabama legislature enacted a statute which provided: "any public
employee who joins or participates in a labor union or labor organization forfeits the rights,
benefits or privileges which be enjoys as a result of his public employment." ALA. LAWS 1953,
No. 720.
64. 353 U.S. at 366.
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a state court determination of the cause? 5 The answer to the inquiry
depends upon the extent to which the federal questions are urged in the
state court proceedings. In England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners66 a number of chiropractic examiners challenged the con-
stitutionality of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act as it applied to their
profession. The district court abstained from exercising their jurisdiction,
remitting the case to the Louisiana state courts for their determination
of the issues raised. Jurisdiction was retained by the district court pend-
ing their determination. Both state and federal law questions were urged
and actually litigated by appellants in the state courts. The state court
determination of these questions was adverse to the appellant's claims.
Thereafter, without appealing to the United States Supreme Court, the
appellant returned to the district court for a determination of those same
federal questions actually litigated in the state court proceedings. In the
course of its opinion the court noted the dilemma of the appellant when
it stated: "on the one hand, in view of Windsor he [the appellants] dare
not restrict his state court case to local law issues. On the other, if as
required by Wndsor, he raises the federal questions there, well established
principles [res judicata] will bar a relitigation of those issues in the
United States District Court.6 7 In addition, the Court said that since no
questions will remain which were not decided by the state courts, the
party is effectively deprived of an initial federal court determination of
his federal claims. Although recourse to the United States Supreme Court
may be had by appeal or certiorari after the state court determination,
that is no more than the appellant would have had, had he never invoked
the federal district court's jurisdiction.68 In regard to the abstention doc-
trine the court concluded, "all this seems contrary to the principle under-
lying the doctrine..., which has been said not to involve the abdication
of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise."69
The Court held that since the Louisiana courts have passed on the
constitutional and state issues the district court was without power to
review them and that the proper remedy was an appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.
70
This case is commonly read as saying that if the plaintiff actually
litigates in the state court proceedings the constitutional questions raised
and the state courts make a determination thereon, the plaintiff has
waived his opportunity to have an initial federal court determination of
65. If both federal and state law questions are litigated at the state level, relitigation
of the federal questions by the district court would be res judicata.
66. 194 F. Supp. 521 (1961) ; Prob. juris. noted, 372 U.S. 964 (1963).
67. 194 F. Supp. at 522.
68. Id.
69. Id. (The court cited Harrison v. NAA.C.P. 360 U.S. 167 (1959) at 177).
70. Id.
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the federal questions urged. His proper remedy is appeal or certiorari
to the Supreme Court. However, if the plaintiff merely raises the federal
questions in the state courts, in order to make them a matter of record,
and does not actually litigate them or do any other acts indicative of his
waiving his right to an initial federal court determination of the federal
questions involved, the plaintiff is entitled, upon completion of the state
court adjudication of only the state law questions involved, to an initial
federal court determination of the federal questions raised. In this way
the Windsor requirement is satisfied because the state court can decide
the state law questions in light of the federal questions raised. In addition,
since there has been no actual litigation and final determination of the
federal questions involved by the state court, res judicata will not bar an
initial federal court determination of these questions.
CONCLUSION
According to the trend of the case law today, the abstention doctrine
is becoming more and more an exercise of discretion by the federal court
judge. In a per curiam71 opinion the Supreme Court suggested that they
are more willing to rely on the discretion of the trial court in determining
whether or not to abstain. The Court stated: "when the validity of a state
statute, challenged under the United States Constitution, is properly for
adjudication before a United States District Court, reference to the state
courts for construction of the statute should not automatically be made.
' 72
Due to the fact that the doctrine is becoming more and more an exer-
cise of discretion, it is that much more difficult to establish clear-cut
guides to its applicability. A noted authority 73 on the federal court system
outlines a suggested approach to the problem of the abstention doctrine
as a matter of discretion.
His suggested key to the solution of this problem is a "meaningful
grant of discretion ' 74 in the trial judges, leaving their decision to hear
the case, or to stay it, retaining jurisdiction pending a state court deter-
mination, or to dismiss it entirely in favor of the state courts, virtually
unreviewable. The boundaries within which this discretion would be exer-
cisable are three-fold. First, the trial judge must stay those cases in
which a federal constitutional question is intermingled with an unsettled
state law question.75 Second, the trial judge should be apprised of the
fact that the abstention doctrine is not to be exercised merely for the
convenience of the federal courts, but rather it is to be exercised for the
71. NA.A.C.P. v. Bennett 360 U.S. 471 (1959) (the case involved a "Pullman Type"
abstention).
72. Id. at 471.
73. Charles Alan Wright, Professor of Law, University of Texas.
74. Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, supra note 2, at 825.
75. Id. at 826 (Wright is referring specifically to the "Pullman Type" of case).
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purposes of federalismY.7 Within these limits, legal and equitable distinc-
tions should be disregarded and the doctrine should be applied uni-
formly.77 Finally, the difficulty of ascertaining what the state law is,
should be considered by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion.
However, this factor alone should be inadequate to justify the exercise
of abstention.78
Although the writer agrees with Prof. Wright's suggestion as to what
is the key to the solution of the problem and with his second and third
boundaries one finds it difficult to accept the first suggested boundary,
which is paradoxical to his suggested key to the solution. On the one hand
he suggests that the trial judge should exercise a meaningful discretion.
On the other, he states that in the "Pullman type" of case the trial judge
must stay the proceedings. Thus, he gives discretion with his right hand,
and takes it away with his left.
In order for the abstention doctrine to be an effective instrument to
be used to achieve the purposes for which it was developed, namely to
avoid a premature determination of constitutional questions when state
law questions may be dispositive of the cause and to preserve the smooth
operations of the state and federal governmental systems, it must be
exercised with a meaningful consistency. It is suggested, therefore, that
in regard to the exercise of abstention by the federal courts nothing
should be automatic. 79 Rather, the trial judge, in the exercise of the
abstention doctrine, should exercise a meaningful discretion, without any
musts attached, taking into consideration the purposes for which the
doctrine was established along with the second and third suggested
boundaries within which the doctrine should be exercised as espoused
by Professor Wright.
John Edward Dratch
76. Id. (Wright is aiming specifically at Mottolese and Beiersdor, the two second circuit
cases, upholding this type of abstention).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See NAA.C-P. v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
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